

OXC-238/
Copy 6 of 6

4 January 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Department of State, Relations with

REFERENCE : OXC-2355 dated 29 December 1961

1. As indicated in ref, a meeting was arranged with the Director, Intelligence and Research, Department of State, and members of his staff on 2 January 1962. This meeting lasted from 1130 hours to 1230 hours on that date and in attendance were:

Roger Hilman, Director, Intelligence and Research,
Thomas Hughes, Deputy to Mr. Hilman
Joseph Scott, Deputy Director for Coordination,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Special Group
editors)
Howard Viedemann, COMOR Representative
T. Archilles Polyzoides, TCO/Department of State
Col. Stanley Bearli, Acting Chief, DFD
James Cunningham, Jr., Assistant Chief, DFD
James Q. Reber, TCO/CIA
[redacted] Chief, Security Branch, DFD

2. After certain preliminary remarks by Col. Bearli, the writer described the difference between the security precautions taken to protect operational information pertaining to IDEALIST, CORONA, and ARGON and similar precautions taken to protect the product of these overhead reconnaissance projects; i.e., the "T" System.

3. The State Department officers present indicated that they understand the fact that a product clearance does not per se authorize access to operational information and vice versa. After the preliminary discussions emphasizing the above facts, I briefly introduced the [redacted] System which establishes standard procedures for the security aspects of these overhead reconnaissance sensitive programs. I went on to point out that there are several other programs in the developmental stages which ultimately will be introduced into the [redacted] System, and key officials throughout Government will be briefed as to the nature of these other programs at an appropriate time.

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DATE: 100/1/72 REVIEWER: _____

This document contains information
referring to OXCART, IDEALIST,
CORONA & ARGON

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4. In view of the fact that this meeting was called as a direct result of Mr. Hilman's mention of the word ONCART before the USIB on 28 December 1961, Mr. Reber observed that we should definitely address ourselves to the extent to which ONCART information is known within the Department. Mr. Hilman at that point acknowledged that he had committed faux pas in uttering ONCART before the USIB. He stated, however, that the State Department officials at the instant meeting in addition to the Secretary, Under Secretary Hall, Alexis Johnson (Special Group member), and Mr. Flowerree are also aware of ONCART. It had been previously mentioned by the writer that according to the records of the Project Security Officer no one within the Department of State has been approved for access to Project ONCART since it is still in the developmental stage and product from such project is not anticipated for possibly as much as 18 months in the future.

5. Mr. Hilman declared that Alexis Johnson participated in a Special Group meeting wherein a comprehensive briefing was given on Project ONCART. Mr. Johnson in turn briefed the Secretary and the Under Secretary, and the other officers who are aware were briefed in turn.

6. Mr. Hilman and Mr. Scott, with contributions from other State officials, made the point that although ONCART is in the developmental stage, certain information concerning such a program is essential to key officials in the Department. It was pointed out, for example, that at the present time the Department has been concerning itself with reaching a decision as to the granting of political approval for the TACKLE operation. A very logical question, according to Mr. Hilman, for the Department to raise as a condition precedent to its arriving at a decision with regard to TACKLE would be: Is there another capability better than TACKLE available to do the job? He went on to point out that if, for example, a better vehicle would be available within the next two months, the reaction of the Department to the employment of TACKLE now could well be in the negative. He added as a postscript to the above comment that at the Special Group meeting of this week the Department will undoubtedly concur in the recommendation that TACKLE get off the ground.

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8. At this point in the discussion the writer requested Mr. Polyzoides, the Department TCO and soon to be designated Control Officer, to prepare a memorandum to me restating the individuals within the Department who are aware of OXCART and to request Project access approvals for these individuals. It was emphasized to Mr. Hilman that an extremely rigorous hold-down on OXCART has been in effect since its initiation. Mention was made of the fact that the number of people throughout the community who have been briefed on this program is relatively small. Of course, it was indicated that since the program is a joint Air Force/CIA operation, within the Air Force and the CIA, the large majority of cleared individuals are therein located. But, even within the CIA, it was emphasized that individuals are granted access only upon strong justification and on the basis of a positive contribution to the program.

9. Mr. Hilman asked if any members of Congress were briefed, and it was indicated to him that the DCI had in the past briefed members of the Senate Armed Forces Preparedness Committee and the House Appropriations Committee. According to Mr. Hilman, he asked this question since a Senator had mentioned OXCART to Mr. Hilman last year. In response to my query as to whether the Senator was a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Mr. Hilman replied in the affirmative and showing a reluctance to identify the Senator specifically, declared that it was Jackson, Symington, or Russell. Mr. Hilman stated that the Senator assumed that Mr. Hilman, in his capacity as Director, ISA, was aware of OXCART.

10. As the discussion went on Col. Bearli emphasized the fact that this Agency would have to rely heavily upon Mr. Hilman to maintain a rigid hold-down on such operational sensitive information within the Department and take a hard-nose approach to concurring in requests for clearances for additional State Department personnel. Mr. Hilman expressed an appreciation of this responsibility and indicated that he understood that in his capacity such was certainly his responsibility. Col. Bearli also mentioned the fact that State Department communications

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Mr. Hilman agreed. At this point I inquired of Mr. Polyzoides as to whether he had forwarded to Mr. Hilman the memorandum signed by the DD/P containing a restatement of the established security procedures within the Department of State pertaining to IDEALIST, CORONA and ARCON, and he replied that he had not. I asked Mr. Polyzoides before the group to send such memorandum in to Mr. Hilman.

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11. On 4 January 1962 I called Mr. T. Achilles Polyzoides and reminded him of the memorandum due from him referred to in paragraph 8 above. After apologizing for the delay he assured me that he will have the memorandum to me by 8/9 January 1962. I asked him at that time to ascertain the date of the meeting of the Special Group when Mr. Alexis Johnson received the comprehensive briefing of OXCART according to Mr. Hillman. Upon noting that he reacted slowly to this request implying difficulties, I indicated that I would check directly with Mr. Tom Parrott. On the same day, Mr. Parrott telephonically advised that to the best of his knowledge no comprehensive discussion of OXCART took place before the Special Group. He remarked that the name was mentioned incidental to discussions of the Dr. Charyk/Mr. Russell relationship and, consequently, the program was identified as a manned reconnaissance capability. He felt quite certain, however, that details of the project were not discussed, and he emphasized this feeling by stating that he personally is not aware of such detailed aspects of the program.

12. With the concurrence of the Acting Chief, DPD, and the DD/P, upon the receipt of the Polyzoides memorandum, I will:

- a. Interview Mr. Polyzoides further with regard to the extent of details of OXCART known at the Department.
- b. Interview Mr. Alexis Johnson concerning the extent of information contained as a result of the alleged Special Group discussions of OXCART.
- c. Process for Project access officials of the Department who are aware of OXCART and who in the opinion of the DD/P require continuing access.
- d. Brief (Black Book - Limited) such State officials as to the Security aspects of OXCART. No operational details will be given. (Mr. Russell may desire to brief the Secretary and the Under Secretary.)
- e. Security brief and debrief other State officials who are aware but do not require access.
- f. Identify to Mr. Hillman and Mr. Polyzoides persons approved for access.
- g. Discuss with Mr. John Warner, CIA Legislative Counsel, briefing of selected staff members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Appropriations Committee to encourage tight control of project information.


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h. For his request, apprise Mr. Tom Parrott of the extent of OXCART information released to uncleared persons by the Special Group and endeavor to assure that he keeps the Acting Chief, DFD, apprised of such discussions in the future in the event uncleared individuals participate.



Chief, Security Branch
DFD-DD/P

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
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APPROVAL:

Mr. Bissell read this memorandum and conveyed his view that the courses of action outlined in paragraph 12 are "absolutely right".

10 January 1962



Assistant to the DD/P

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